Free Will and Luck

Alfred R Mele

2006年3月 · Oxford University Press

電子書

240

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符合資格

評分和評論未經驗證瞭解詳情

將於 1月28日降價 31%

關於這本電子書

Mele's ultimate purpose in this book is to help readers think more clearly about free will. He identifies and makes vivid the most important conceptual obstacles to justified belief in the existence of free will and meets them head on. Mele clarifies the central issue in the philosophical debate about free will and moral responsibility, criticizes various influential contemporary theories about free will, and develops two overlapping conceptions of free will - one for readers who are convinced that free will is incompatible with determinism (incompatibilists), and the other for readers who are convinced of the opposite (compatibilists). Mele's theory offers an original perspective on an important problem and will garner the attention of anyone interested in the debate on free will.

關於作者

Alfred R. Mele is the William H. and Lucyle T. Werkmeister Professor of Philosophy at Florida State University. He is author of Irrationality (OUP 1987), Springs of Action (OUP 1992), Autonomous Agents (OUP 1995), and Motivation and Agency (OUP 2003), the editor of The Philosophy of Action (OUP 1997), and coeditor of Mental Causation (OUP 1993) and The Oxford Handbook of Rationality (OUP 2004).