Agent Causality

· Synthese Library 第 283 冊 · Springer Science & Business Media
4.0
2 則評論
電子書
168
頁數
評分和評論未經驗證 瞭解詳情

關於這本電子書

We act for reasons. But, it is sometimes claimed, the mental states and events that make up reasons, are not sufficient conditions of actions. Reasons never make actions happen. We- as agents (persons, selves, subjects) - make our actions happen. Actions are done by us, not elicited by reasons. The present essay is an attempt to understand this concept of agent causality. Who -~ or what - is an agent ? And how - in virtue of what - does an agent do things, or refrain from doing them? The first chapter deals with problems in the theory of action that seem to require the assumption that actions are controlled by agents. Chapters two and three then review and discuss theories of agent cau sality. Chapters four and five make up the central parts of the essay in which my own solution is put forth, and chapter six presents some data that seem to support this view. Chapter seven discusses how the theory can be reconciled with neuro-physiological facts. And in the last two chapters the theory is confronted with conflicting viewpoints and phe nomena. Daniel Robinson and Richard Swinburne took time to read parts of the manuscript in draft form. Though they disagree with my main viewpoints on the nature of the self, their conunents were very helpful. I hereby thank them both.

評分和評論

4.0
2 則評論

為這本電子書評分

請分享你的寶貴意見。

閱讀資訊

智能手機和平板電腦
請安裝 Android 版iPad/iPhone 版「Google Play 圖書」應用程式。這個應用程式會自動與你的帳戶保持同步,讓你隨時隨地上網或離線閱讀。
手提電腦和電腦
你可以使用電腦的網絡瀏覽器聆聽在 Google Play 上購買的有聲書。
電子書閱讀器及其他裝置
如要在 Kobo 等電子墨水裝置上閱覽書籍,你需要下載檔案並傳輸到你的裝置。請按照說明中心的詳細指示,將檔案傳輸到支援的電子書閱讀器。